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I n the last four years, there has been increasing concern by 
developed countries about the 
potential erosion of the corporate 
income tax base by “harmful tax 
competition” (in the European 
Union since 1997, in the OECD 
since 1998). However, the data on 
tax competition available to date 
present a mixed and somewhat 
puzzling picture. 
On the one hand, there is 
considerable evidence that 
effective corporate income tax 
rates in many countries have been 
declining, and that the worldwide 
effective tax rates on multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) have been 
going down as well. On the other 
hand, macroeconomic data from 
developed countries do not indicate 
a significant decline in corporate 
income tax revenues. 
This article suggests that part 
of the explanation for this phenom- 
enon is that despite the advent of 
e-commerce, MNEs find it harder 
than some commentators (Avi- 
Yonah, 1997)” have predicted to 
avoid having a permanent 
establishment (PE) in market 
jurisdictions. As a result, those 
jurisdictions are able to collect 
taxes from the MNEs and keep up 
their corporate tax revenues. The 
decline in effective corporate tax 
rates may therefore be attributable 
more to tax competition in juris- 
dictions where MNEs produce 
their goods, which are more likely 
to be developing countries, whose 
revenue data are less available. 
If this conjecture is correct, tax 
competition may be harming 
developing countries more than 
developed economies. However, 
developed economies may also face 
declining revenues from tax 
competition if methods are 
developed to use e-commerce to 
avoid a PE. The article concludes 
by exploring the implications of 
this hypothesis and what data are 
needed to confirm or disconfirm it. 
I. The Puzzle: Declining 
Effective Tax Rates and 
Unchanged Corporate 
Tax Revenues 
There is a considerable body of 
data suggesting that worldwide 
effective corporate tax rates are 
declining. For example, Altshuler, 
Grubert, and Newlon (2001) used 
U.S. Treasury data from corporate 
tax returns between 1984 and 
1992 to calculate average effective 
tax rates for manufacturing affili- 
ates of US. MNEs in about 60 
countries. They find that average 
effective tax rates in manufactur- 
ing fell by more than 15 percent 
between 1984 and 1992. Similarly, 
Grubert (2001) calculated changes 
in effective corporate tax rates in a 
sample of 60 countries for the 
period from 1984 to 1992, supple- 
mented by published financial 
data for the period after 1992. He 
found that average effective tax 
rates fell from 32.9 percent in 1984 
to 23 percent in 1992. The decline 
was largest in countries with popu- 
lations of less than 15 million. 
Chennells and Griffith ( 1997) 
calculated effective marginal tax 
rates (EMTR) and effective 
average tax rates (EATR) for 10 
OECD countries for the period 
1979-1994 on the basis of the 
Fullerton-King (1984) model. They 
also calculated average tax rates 
(ATR) based on published financial 
data for the same period. 
Chennells and Griffith find that 
domestic EMTRs declined from an 
average of 21.7 percent in 1979 to 
20.5 percent in 1994, and that 
domestic EATRs (which may be 
more relevant to FDI) declined 
from 21.7 percent to 17.9 percent 
in the same period. ATRs based on 
accounting data for six countries 
(Australia, France, Germany, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States) declined from 
40 percent in 1985 to 32.6 percent 
in 1994. Note that this last result 
is based on firm-level (Compustat) 
data and includes foreign affiliates 
of MNEs based in these countries. 
All the data are consistent with 
the hypothesis that tax competi- 
tion may be eroding the corporate 
income tax base. Grubert (2001) 
and Chennells and Griffith (1997) 
point out that the data do not 
indicate any tendency of tax rates 
to converge. However, as I have 
argued elsewhere (Avi-Yonah, 
20001, tax competition may be 
driving tax rates down in all 
countries as they respond to each 
other, so that there need be no 
convergence until rates reach zero 
percent. 
On the other hand, the available 
data on revenues from the 
corporate income tax in developed 
countries do not show any indica- 
tion of significant erosion in the 
same period. Corporate income tax 
revenues as a percentage of total 
revenues in OECD members were 
*See list of references on p. 1399. 
Tax Notes International 17 September 2001 l 13% 
 
Doc 2001-23778 (6 pgs)
TAX ANALYSTS TAX DOCUMENT SERVICE
Special Reports 
8 percent in 1975,1980,1985, 
1990,1994, and 1995 (Owens and 
Sasseville, 1997). This average 
masks considerable variation. 
For example, in New Zealand 
corporate tax revenues fell from 
10.8 percent in 1975-1980 to 8.3 
percent in 1986-1992. In the 
United States revenues fell from 
14.7 percent to 9.8 percent during 
the same period (IMF, 1995). But it 
can hardly be said that corporate 
tax revenues for OECD member 
countries are eroding. Thus, it is 
hard to see what concerns are 
driving the European Union and 
the OECD in their anti-tax- 
competition crusades. 
What can explain the phenom- 
enon of declining effective 
corporate tax rates but stable 
corporate tax revenues? One 
possible explanation is that there 
has been a shift within the 
corporate tax from taxing MNEs to 
taxing purely domestic corpora- 
tions, since most of the declining 
tax rate data reported above comes 
from tax returns and financial 
disclosures by MINES, while the 
revenue data include all corpora- 
tions. (The EMTR and EATR data 
reported by ChennelIs and Griffith 
apply to all corporations, but are 
based on theoretical models rather 
than actual tax returns.) 
If that is the case, it would 
present an incentive for all corpo- 
rations to become MNEs, which is 
interesting given the current US. 
debate on deferral and subpart F 
of the Internal Revenue Code 
(NFK!, 1999; US. Treasury, 2000). 
Given this incentive, one would 
have expected by now to see some 
decline in the overall revenue 
figures. In addition, given the 
political clout of small business in 
most countries, one would have 
expected to hear something had it 
experienced a significant increase 
in effective tax rates. 
An alternative hypothesis is as 
follows: MNEs can be taxed in 
three types of jurisdictions under 
currently prevailing tax rules. The 
first type is their residence juris- 
diction, where the parent company 
is incorporated or managed and 
controlled. These jurisdictions 
typically do not tax their resident 
MNEs currently on active foreign- 
source income. The second type is 
jurisdictions in which the MNEs 
produce goods, which are to an 
increasing extent developing 
countries. These jurisdictions, 
whether developed or developing, 
typically do not tax MNEs either 
because they wish to attract real 
investment. Finally, the third type 
is jurisdictions into which MNEs 
sell their goods, typically developed 
countries. These jurisdictions 
typically want to tax MNEs but 
It can hardly be said that 
corporate tax revenues 
for OECD member 
countries are eroding. 
Thus, it is hard to see 
what concerns are 
driving the European 
Union and the OECD in 
their anti-tax- 
competition crusades. 
can do so only if the MNE has a 
PE within their borders. 
I have previously argued that e- 
commerce makes it relatively easy 
for MNEs to avoid having a PE in 
market jurisdictions. If so, no 
jurisdiction can tax the MNE on a 
current basis. But if MNEs are not 
able to avoid having a PE, they 
will be taxed in the market juris- 
diction. If that is the case, the data 
above can be explained as follows: 
The Altshuler, Grubert, and 
Newlon (2001) and Grubert (2001) 
data and the Chennells and 
Griffith (1997) ATR data all reflect 
worldwide operations of MNEs. 
These data therefore show 
declining effective tax rates due 
primarily to tax competition for 
manufacturing activity, and the 
lack of residual residence-based 
taxation. Recall that the two 
studies based on U.S. Treasury 
data focused on manufacturing 
affiliates, and that Grubert (2001) 
found the greatest decline in small 
countries. However, MNEs are still 
taxed - and may be taxed more 
heavily - in countries where they 
sell their goods, assuming a PE 
exists. These countries are largely 
developed countries, so it is not 
surprising that their revenue data 
show no decline in corporate tax 
revenues. 
In effect, this hypothesis 
suggests that the corporate tax base 
has been shifted from exporters to 
importers, and that in countries 
which have market power and the 
ability to tax importers, the result 
has been no decline in overall 
corporate tax revenues. A similar 
phenomenon has been documented 
within the United States, where 
tax competition has led states to 
adjust their formulas for taxing 
corporate income from payroll and 
assets (production) to sales 
(consumption>, thereby taxing 
importers more than exporters 
(Brunori, 2001). 
In the international context, the 
key to this hypothesis is that 
MNEs are unsuccessful in 
avoiding having a PE in market 
jurisdictions. Given the rise of 
e-commerce, which on the face of 
things enables MNEs to sell into a 
jurisdiction and avoid a PE, why 
would this be the case? 
II. Can MNEs Avoid 
Having a PE by Using 
E-Commerce? 
The standard literature on 
international taxation of 
e-commerce routinely emphasizes 
that e-commerce makes it possible 
to avoid having a PE. As the U.S. 
Treasury noted in its path- 
breaking 1996 White Paper, a PE 
requires physical presence in a 
country and e-commerce can be 
conducted without physical 
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Customers 
presence, that is to say, without a 
(Horner and Owens, 1996; 
Tillinghast, 1996; Owens, 1997; 
PE. Commentators have generally 
The Economist, 1997; Avi-Yonah, 
1997; Doernberg and Hinnekens, 
followed suit, some predicting the 
1998; Kessler, 1999; Cockfield, 
1999; Sawyer, 1999; Hardesty, 
demise of source-based taxation 
1999; Chan, 2000; Frieden, 2000; 
Cockfield, 2001). 
But is this accurate under 
current conditions? A recent case 
study presented at an American 
Bar Association Section of 
Taxation meeting suggests that in 
practice it may not be so easy for 
MNEs to avoid having a PE in 
market jurisdictions, even if they 
sell in e-commerce (ABA, 2001). 
The case study is as follows: 
paid on a per “click-through” basis. 
e-commerce by providing content 
Under Option I, Dot.com-U.S. 
would form a holding company in a 
to subscribers over the Internet. 
tax-friendly jurisdiction known as 
Dot.com-International. (See 
Dot.com-U.S. also provides banner 
diagram.) That company would be 
an international holding company 
that would at some point engage in 
advertising to third parties and is 
an IPO. Dot.com-International 
would form ServerCo in a tax- 
friendly jurisdiction. ServerCo 
would be the owner of all foreign 
content and would serve that 
content to foreign users, subject to 
connectivity related limitations. 
The International Roll-Out 
of an E-Commerce 
Business 
Option I - ServerCo 
I. Basic Background 
Dot.com-U.S. is a Delaware 
company that is engaged in 
Dot.com-International would 
form local subsidiaries to act as an 
agent for ServerCo. The subsid- 
iaries would enter into content 
agreements with local providers 
and enter into banner, sponsorship, 
e-commerce and other arrange- 
ments with local companies as 
agent. However, those arrange- 
ments would be entered into by 
the local Dot.com companies on 
behalf of ServerCo. Dot.com-U.S. 
would license existing content to 
ServerCo on an arm’s-length basis. 
All new content and other intellec- 
tual property (IP) would be 
developed in the United States, 
but ServerCo would own the 
foreign rights to the IP pursuant to 
a cost-sharing agreement. 
II. Tax Issues 
l What is the appropriate juris- 
diction for Dot.com-Interna- 
tional and ServerCo? 
l The primary disadvantage of 
this structure is that ServerCo 
would need to be managed in 
its country of residence and 
would need to take care that it 
does not have a taxable pres- 
ence, or PE, in the operating 
countries. This may be difficult 
to achieve. There are also 
undesirable VAT implications 
of this structure. 
l The taxation of the country of 
residence of Dot.com-Interna- 
tional needs to be considered. 
l The purpose of this structure is 
to migrate profits into a low- 
tax jurisdiction, away from the 
high tax nets of the Europe 
Union and the United States, 
where profits would be taxed 
at rates near 35 percent. 
l How does ServerCo gain access 
to the U.S. created IP? Is it a 
transfer of IP, or a license 
agreement between Dotcorn- 
U.S. and the ServerCo? What’s 
the difference? 
l How does the cost-sharing 
agreement work into the 
transfer issues? 
l What are the subpart F conse- 
quences of the operation of the 
group? Would the US. anti- 
deferral rules under subpart F 
apply to ServerCo? 
l Could ServerCo and the 
operating companies “check- 
the-box” to be treated as trans- 
parent for U.S. tax purposes? 
Would this allow for free move- 
ment of dividends without 
subpart F consequences? 
Tax Notes International 17 September 2001 l 1397 
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Option II - LicenseCo 
I. Background 
The basic structure of Option II 
is similar to Option I. (See 
diagram.) It is assumed that 
Dot.com-International would be 
formed as a Dutch company that 
would establish an Irish IP 
LicenseCo, which would own the 
content but would license the 
content to the individual operating 
companies owned by Dotcom- 
International. These companies 
would act as an agent to generate 
content on behalf of LicenseCo and 
would then license the content and 
other IP from LicenseCo. In 
contrast to Option I, the local 
operating companies would serve 
the content over the Internet to 
consumers and practices and 
would enter into alliances, spon- 
sorships, etc. for their own account. 
As in Option I, Dot.com-Interna- 
tional would be treated as a corpo- 
ration for U.S. tax purposes while 
the other entities would check-the- 
box to be treated as passthrough 
entities. As in Option I, Dot.com- 
U.S. would license any existing 
content and IP to LicenseCo on an 
arm&-length basis. 
II. Tax Issues 
l The primary benefit of this 
structure is to allow the oper- 
ating companies to act for their 
own account in their local 
jurisdictions. This avoids the 
risk that LicenseCo would 
have a PE in the local operat- 
ing jurisdictions and is easier 
from a VAT standpoint. This 
would also provide the flexi- 
bility to manage the company 
from outside the country of 
incorporations. 
l Does the structure achieve a 
deferral of tax in that the local 
operating companies would pay 
to LicenseCo royalties that 
would be deducted against 
local taxable income? Would 
this create subpart F income? 
l What role would the check-the- 
box rules play in the structure? 
what is striking about this 
example, developed by knowledge- 
able practitioners, is how difficult 
it is to avoid having a PE. The first 
option is designed to do so, because 
all content is delivered via 
ServerCo. However, because 
content has to be developed locally, 
there needs to be local agents and, 
as the case study indicates, this 
means that avoiding a PE may be 
difficult to achieve. The second 
option abandons that attempt alto- 
gether. The local companies deliver 
the content and are clearly 
taxable, preferring to reduce 
taxation via royalties. But this 
more conservative structure is 
subject to transfer pricing review 
of the royalty rate, and may not 
significantly reduce taxes unless 
most of the value is inherent in the 
IP. 
In general, iflocal agents are 
needed to develop content, a PE 
may be impossible to avoid - even 
when actual revenue comes from 
advertising. (In the classic Piedras 
Negras case, a radio station that 
broadcast in English from Mexico 
and derived all its revenues from 
advertising was held not to have a 
PE, but it developed its own 
content). The same result may 
occur if local agents are needed for 
marketing, distribution, or 
servicing of the goods. 
There are some MNEs, like 
Intel or Microsoft, whose products 
“sell themselves” and do not need a 
PE. Intel boasted in full page 
advertisements of selling over a 
billion U.S. dollars worth of chips 
in e-commerce, and all its manu- 
facturing operations outside the 
United States benefit from tax 
holidays. But for other MNEs the 
ability to avoid a PE is less clear 
Those MNEs are much more likely 
to be taxed in market jurisdictions. 
This reality may explain the 
relaxed attitude of the OECD 
toward modifying the PE concept 
in light of e-commerce, which 
contrasts sharply with the urgency 
characterizing the tax competition 
project. On 22 December 2000, 
after more than a year of delibera- 
tions, the OECD’s Committee on 
Fiscal Af&irs adopted a change to 
the commentary on article 5 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention, the 
PE article. The change clarified 
1398 l 17 September 2001 Tax Notes International 
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that in some circumstances, a 
server may constitute a PE, while 
a Web site by itself does not. The 
committee referred to five 
technical advisory groups (TAGS) 
that were considering whether any 
broader changes were needed in 
the application of the business 
profits article to e-commerce. So 
far the TAGS came up with rules 
to classify various sources of 
income from e-commerce. Of 28 
categories of income, the TAGS 
classified 25 as business profits 
and only 3 as royalties (Schickli, 
2001). This means that for most 
types of income from e-commerce, 
there will be no source-based tax 
unless a PE exists, and the TAGS 
made no changes in the PE defini- 
tion itself (For the categories clas- 
sified as royalties, there is also no 
source-based taxation if a treaty 
based on the OECD model 
applies). 
These recommendations fall far 
short of what is needed to adjust 
the PE concept to the reality of 
e-commerce. As the U.S. Treasury 
noted in 1996, declaring that a 
server constitutes a PE is nonsen- 
sical because a server can be 
located anywhere. Making a Web 
site a PE would have been much 
more radical, but would have 
eviscerated the PE concept 
because even a single sale into a 
jurisdiction via the Web would give 
rise to a PE. What is needed, as I 
have previously argued (Avi-Yonah 
1997), is some de minimis 
threshold of sales, rather than the 
current focus on physical presence. 
But the OECD is in no hurry to 
follow this recommendation, which 
is understandable in light of the 
difficulties of avoiding a PE illus- 
trated above. 
III. Implications 
If the hypothesis outlined above 
is even partially correct, it carries 
interesting implications. For devel- 
oping countries, it means that tax 
competition is a very real and 
present danger, eroding their 
corporate tax revenues and 
resulting in significant windfalls 
for MNEs. This is particularly true 
given that the corporate income 
tax has been a more important 
source of revenue in developing 
countries than in OECD members, 
amounting for 15 percent to 25 
percent of total revenues (IMF 
1995). Most of these revenues 
come from MNEs, since the 
domestic corporate tax base is 
typically meager. 
In developed countries, the 
hypothesis means that, for the 
time being, tax competition does 
not pose an immediate danger of 
corporate revenue base erosion. 
This may be a temporary phenom- 
enon, given the expected continued 
rise in e-commerce, the ingenuity 
of tax planners, and the reluctance 
of the OECD to change the PE 
threshold. In the long run, more 
MNEs may follow Intel’s lead. This 
may explain the urgency of the 
OECD tax competition initiative 
(although even that initiative does 
not focus on real investment). 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to 
advance one explanation for a 
seemingly puzzling incongruence 
in the available data on tax compe- 
tition: effective corporate tax rates 
on MNEs are going down, but 
corporate tax revenues in OECD 
member countries are stable. One 
explanation may be that OECD 
members are successfully shifting 
their tax base from exporters to 
importers, and that importers are 
less able to avoid a PE (and 
therefore tax liability) than 
previous commentators have 
supposed. 
If that is the case then tax 
competition may, prima facie, be 
most harmful to developing 
countries that generally export 
more goods produced by MNEs 
than they import. In the long run, 
tax competition may harm 
developed countries as well as 
MNEs find new ways of avoiding 
PEs through e-commerce. And 
even in the short run, a shift in the 
tax base from exporters to 
importers may have negative 
welfare implications (Slemrod, 
1995). 
It should be emphasized that 
the hypothesis advanced above is 
based on very limited data. To 
confirm or refute it, much addi- 
tional work is needed. In partic- 
ular, it would be helpful to know 
whether the data relied on by 
Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon 
(2001) and Grubert (2001) show 
greater declines in effective tax 
rates in developing than in 
developed countries. 
In addition, data for developing 
countries need to be explored to 
see whether those jurisdictions 
show a decline in revenues from 
the corporate income tax. Data 
from developed countries are 
needed to see whether there has 
been a sh.iR in the corporate tax 
base from exporters to importers 
and what are the revenue trends 
from taxpayers engaged in elec- 
tronic commerce. Hopefully, such 
data can become available in the 
near future. 
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